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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent,. 
-vs- Case No. 
: 13751 
HARRY MAESTAS, 
Defendant-Appellant* V 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Harry Maestas, appeals from a 
conviction of second degree murder in the Second Judicial 
District Court, Weber County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Harry Maestas, was convicted 
by a jury verdict of second degree murder, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (Supp. 1975), on June 27f 
1974. Appellant was thereafter sentenced to the Utah 
State Prison on July 10, 1974, for a term of five years 
to life. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent asks that the jury verdict, and 
sentence imposed pursuant thereto, be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On December 31r 1973, the body of Rosemary 
Matteucci was found floating face down in Mill Stream 
on the upper Canyon Road in Ogden, Utah (Tr.161-163). 
She had been shot once in the head (Tr.584-585). Later 
that day, appellant was arrested and subsequently charged 
with first degree murder for the shooting death of Miss 
Matteucci. 
On June 20, 1974, a jury was selected and 
impaneled to try the facts of the case. Before the 
court heard any evidence on June 21st, the son-in-law 
of Juror No. 12, Mr. Carpenter brought to the court's 
attention that he had had two conversations with his 
father-in-law regarding the case: one about the time 
of the crime and the other the night the jury was 
impaneled. At this hearing (Tr.124-140) counsel for 
both the defense and for the State questioned Juror 
Carpenter and his son-in-law. After hearing their 
testimony, the Court, in its discretion, ruled that 
Mr. Carpenter could remain on the jury and denied 
appellant's motion for mistrial (Tr.147-148). • 
The State introduced evidence that appellant 
had committed a robbery at Deamer Finance just shortly 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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before the murder took place. The court allowed 
the prosecution to introduce this evidence for the 
purpose of showing the appellant's motive for killing 
Miss Matteucci (Tr.184-188; 259s 19-22; 264-313; 
284-287). It was the State's theory that Miss 
Matteucci knew that the appellant had committed the 
Deamer Finance robbery and that she had "snitched" to 
the police that appellant was responsible for it. It 
was further theorized that appellant, learning that 
Miss Matteucci had informed on him, shot her, thus 
preventing her from participating further in the 
police investigation of the robbery (Tr.184-18 5). The 
defense made objections to the introduction of evidence 
relating to the Deamer Finance robbery, but the court 
admitted it for the purpose of showing appellant's 
motive. 
The appellant was found guilty of second degree 
murder and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for five 
years to life. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR MISTRIAL ON THE BASIS OF JURY MISCONDUCT. 
Respondent does not refute the general rule 
that jurors are not permitted to speak with third persons 
or witnesses and that such conduct is presumptively 
prejudicial. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
This presumption is, however, rebuttable 
by showing the communications were harmless and did 
not thereby prejudice defendant's rights. Johnson 
v. United States, 207 F.2d 314 (5th Cir. 1953), 
cert, denied 547 U.S. 938, 98 L.Ed. 1087f 74 S.Ct. 
632.* Respondent contends that the State overcame 
this presumption in the trial court. In the instant 
case, the son-in-law of juror number 12, Mr. 
Carpenter, came forward with the information that he 
had discussed the case with Mr. Carpenter on two 
occasions: once about the time of the murder and 
the second time the night the jury was impaneled. 
(Tr.125; 14-18; 126; 5-9). Juror Carpenter was 
questioned by counsel for the defense and for the 
State the next morning before the trial commenced 
(Tr. 124; 7-12). 
The record discloses that Mr. Carpenter's 
son-in-law, Bradley Dee, learned that his father-in-
law had been impaneled as a juror in the Maestas case 
and went to his house to tell him he should not be 
a juror because of their conversation several months 
earlier (Tr.137;- 1-8). Under examination Carpenter 
stated he could not remember if the appellant's name 
had been mentioned in the first conversation (Tr.127; 
*Ellis v. State of Oklahoma, 430 F.2d 1352 
(10th Cir. 1970), cert, denied 401 U.S. 1010, 28 
L.Ed.2d 546, 91 S.Ct. 1260. Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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14-19. He couldn' t remember when that conversation took 
place; (Tr,128; 11-18) nor could he recall who was 
present during the conversation (Tr.128; 25-27). 
Mr. Carpenter summed up his recollection of that first 
conversation by saying: 
"I had pretty much forgotten 
about it and it was just this 
reminder that just brought it 
back, this flash memory but I 
wouldnft even remember had I not 
been called to jury. . . I recall 
hearing the name Maestas and 
this brought back a memory when 
I heard it yesterday." (Tr.129; 
11-19) . 
Mr. Carpenter was consistent in his attitude 
toward his responsibilities as a juror. Under questioning 
he said he had formed no opinion as to the case (Tr. 
130; 24-29); he stated he was not prejudiced or biased 
toward the defendant (Tr.133; 1-3); and he expressed 
that he wanted to be fair to both sides (Tr.133; 9-11). 
At one point Mr. Carpenter did say that he 
would "probably not" want a juror with his frame of 
mind to sit on his case were the positions reversed, 
but this was in answer to a rather vague and complicated 
question posed by defense counsel (Tr.130; 15-20); also, 
Mr. Carpenter later addressed himself to that same 
question posed by the prosecutor: 
-5-
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"Juror Carpenter: I feel like I 
could (be a fair and impartial 
juror). The question that Mr. 
Athay asked about, whether Maestas 
would perfer me to be on the jury, 
I can appreciate his position there 
and I know if I do serve on the jury 
that I'll tell him personally that 
I will be as fair as I possibly can. 
* * * 
Mr. Newey: In this specific case 
now,- knowing based on all of the 
questions that you have been asked 
by Mr. Athay and myself, do you feel 
that a man in your frame of mind would 
give Mr. Maestas a fair trial? 
Juror Carperter: Yes sir, I believe 
I could." (Tr.133; 12-30; 134: 
1-17) . 
Additionally, Bradley Dee, Carpenter's son-
in-law was questioned and even he was uncertain as 
to what was said in his first conversation with Carpenter 
regarding the Matteucci murder: he was unable to 
recall when the conversation took place (Tr.137: 
21-30 and 138: 1-4), who was present during the con-
versation (Tr. 138: 5-7), how long the conversation 
lasted (Tr. 139: 14-20), nor could he remember with 
any particularity what he told his father-in-law 
about the case (Tr. 138: 14-29). 
What the State proved to overcome the presump-
tion is that Mr. Carpenter did not remember clearly 
the conversation with his son-in-law about the time 
of the murder and that he did not think it important 
.-£_ 
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enough to mention while he was being polled as a 
juror* The State proved that his recollection did 
not have sufficient impact to influence him as a 
juror and that he had formed no opinion as to the 
case. Juror Carpenter showed himself to be capable 
and anxious to try the case solely on the evidence 
that was presented, being fair to both sides. 
In his argument, appellant relies on Remitter 
v. United States, 347 U.S. 227, 98 L.Ed. 654, 74 S.Ct. 
450 (1954). In Remmer, an unnamed person communicated 
with a juror who later became foreman, the stranger 
stating that the juror could profit by bringing in a 
verdict favorable to the petitioner in that case. 
Further, the petitioner did not learn of this occurrence 
until reading about it in the newspaper after the guilty 
verdict was already turned in. In Remmer, the Court 
was concerned about the investigation the FBI conducted 
regarding this incident during the course of the trial, 
the Court expressing that this conduct was: 
". . . bound to impress the juror 
and is apt to do so unduly. A 
juror must feel free to exercise 
his functions without the FBI or 
anyone else looking over his 
shoulder. . . ." Ibid. 347 U.S. 
at 229, 230. , • 
Clearly there is not the intrusion nor danger of 
influence in the instant case as that concerning the 
Court in Remmer.* In the case at bar the juror had 
*Also, since the defense did not learn of the case Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trouble even remembering the incident in controversy. 
Then too, by questioning Mr. Carpenter and his son-
in-law, the Court could determine if there was any 
prejudice on the juror's part. 
The discharge or retention of a juror for 
misconduct during the course of a trial and the 
question whether a 'motion for mistrial should be 
granted are matters wholly within the discretion of 
the trial court. Bacino v. United States, 316 F.2d 
11 (10th Cir. 1963), cert, denied, U.S. 831, 11 L.Ed.2d 
62, 84 S.Ct. 76, and Brown v. United States, 380 F. 2d 
477 (10th Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 390 U.S. 962, 19 
L.Ed.2d 1158, 88 S.Ct. 1062. It is a rule of long-
standing that a trial court's discretionary ruling 
should not be overturned unless the trial court 
abuses its discretion.* The trial court should look 
at the circumstances in their entirety: 
"The trial court should not decide 
and take final action ex parte on 
information such as was received in 
this case, but should determine the 
circumstances, the impact thereof upon 
the juror, and whether or not it was 
prejudicial, in a hearing with all 
interested parties permitted to parti-
cipate." Remmer v. United States, infra# 
at 230. 
-Moore v.~?eopls, 125 Colo., 306, 243 P,2d 
425 (1952). 
- f i -
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Appellant cites Stone v. United States, 113 
F.2d 70 (6th Cir. 1940) and United States v. Ferguson, 
486 P.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1973) in support of his conten-
tion that the State failed to overcome the presumption 
of prejudice. While it is true that Stone and Ferguson 
are examples of instances where the jurors were 
sufficiently infected by suspicions and disturbances 
during the respective trials to warrant mistrials, the 
facts comprising those two cases go far beyond the 
wo ta] ks "between Mr. Carpenter and 1 lis son-in-] aw 
in the case at bar. In Stone, thirty witnesses testified 
about an effort to bribe one of the jurors. This juror 
was removed and replaced by an alternate. The judge 
then questioned the entire jury as to whether any had 
been contacted by ai i oi itsider. The defense claimed 
that the suspicion was raised in the minds of those 
remaining that the defendant had instigated some in 
proper ac t i oi i a nd tha 1 : t 1 Ie j udge * s exp 1 oi at ion had 
the effect of "coercing the jurors and depriving them 
of their independent judgment in deciding the case." 
:cL , 1 ] 3 F.2d a i 7 7. . ...; ' '• ' . • "..,.-•• •.-.."••'.••'• '/'.' ' 
In United States v. Fergn :m, supra, a juror, 
Austin, had been invited to a friend's house and there 
he talked about the case. He admitted having discussed 
the case but denied he had talked with any of the jurors 
-9-
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about it. Austin was excused and the remaining jurors 
were told Austin had social contact with a person who 
knew the defendant. A juror later testified that 
Austin had talked twice with him and possibly another 
juror the day after his contact with the defendant's 
friend. The reviewing Court considered the effect 
of the polling of the jurors as to their conduct; 
the court decided that polling, together with the 
remarks by Austin created prejudice. The court 
emphasized: 
"Unfortunately, the matter did 
not come to the attention of 
the court until after Austin had 
already discussed the case with 
other jurors. By then it was too 
late." Id. 486, F.2d at 972. 
What particularly concerned the courts in 
the two preceding cases was that the entire jury was 
-affected in such a way as to raise suspicions in their 
minds that the defendants might have acted in some 
improper manner. There is no such problem in the 
instant case as the matter is isolated to the statements 
made by Mr. Carpenter's son-in-law some months earlier 
of which Mr. Carpenter had only a bare recollection at 
the time he was impaneled. These circumstances do not 
bring this case under the umbrella of protection which is 
-10-
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intended by the granting of a motion for mistrial. 
The trial court properly weighed the testimony of Mr. 
Carpenter and his son-in-law and correctly determined 
that no prejudice resulted to the defendant by 
allowing Juror Carpenter to remain impaneled. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF 
OTHER CRIMES INTO EVIDENCE TO SHOW APPELLANT'S MOTIVE 
FOR THE HOMICIDE OF ROSEMARY MATTEUCCI. 
The trial court allowed the State to admit 
evidence showing that the appellant committed a robbery 
of a finance company a few days before Rosemary Matteucci's 
homicide for the purpose of showing the appellant's motive 
for committing that homicide. The State introduced evidence 
showing that Rosemary Matteucci knew appellant committed 
this robbery and that she had picked out his photograph for 
the police, knowing that the appellant was a robbery suspect 
and said words to the effect that he was "real active in the 
area." (Tr.276: 9-12). Witness Cragun also testified that 
she said, "something about that when you get him on the 
robbery, you will clear some more robberies." (Tr.284: 1-2). 
Further, the State proved that appellant Maestas knew she 
had talked with the police and that she had "snitched" on 
him. Witness William Caffall stated that appellant told 
him in an elevator after his arrest: ". . * but Harry said 
he knew Rosemary was telling." (Tr.365: 13-15; 369: 20-22). 
Generally, evidence of other crimes committed by a 
defendant is not admissible; there are, however, exceptions 
to this rule: 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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"The long-established rule, 
accordingly, forbids the prosecution, 
unless and until the accused gives 
evidence of his good character, to 
introduce initially evidence of the 
bad character of the accused. It is 
not irrelevant, but in the setting of 
jury trial the danger of prejudice out-
weighs the probative value. 
The danger is at its highest 
when character is shown by other 
criminal acts, and the rule about the 
proof of other crimes is but an applica-
tion of the wider prohibition against 
the initial introduction by the prosecu-
tion of evidence of bad character. The 
rule is that the prosecution may not 
introduce evidence of other criminal acts 
of the accused unless the evidence is 
substantially relevant for some other 
purpose than to show a probability that he 
committed the crime on trial because he is 
a man of criminal character. There are 
numerous other purposes for which evidence 
of other criminal acts may be offered, and 
when so offered the rule of exclusion is 
simply inapplicable." McCormick on Evidence, 
2d Ed., § 190 at 447,448. (Emphasis added.) 
The State argued for the admission of this evidence 
en the ground that It was to show motive on the part of 
c:o f erv'l ;••; •
 :-=d o s r.. is , .i nd the t:i: i ^  1 < 'ouri nj 1 ed in fa ,r 
admission on tils ground. This is cri'? of the exceptions 
to the rule stated above. The prosecution is entitled,
 vb) 
To establish motive. This in turn may serve as evidence of 
the identity of the doer of the crime on charge, or of 
d e 1 :i b e i: a t e n e s s , m a 1 1 c e, o :i : a s p e c :i f i c :i n t e n t c o n s t i * • - i n g 
an element of the crime-" Id., § ] 90(6), at: 45 0,4-
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The Utah Supreme Court heard arguments on the 
question of the admissibility of evidence of other crimes 
for proof of motive in the very recent case of State v. 
Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1975). The Court held 
that no prejudice resulted in defendant's trial for mis-
handling public monies where testimony was admitted as 
to another shortage of funds in his department: 
"The general rule is that in 
a criminal case evidence which shows 
or tends to show that the defendant had 
committed another crime in addition to 
that for which he is on trial is 
inadmissible. However, an exception 
to the rule is that evidence of another 
crime is admissible when it tends to 
establish motive; intent; absence of 
mistake or accident; or to show a 
common scheme or plan embracing the 
commission of similar crimes so related 
to each other that the proof of one 
tends to establish the crime for which 
the defendant is on trial." Id.. , 535 
P.2d at 1233. (Emphasis added.) 
The Court's ruling in the Schieving case merely 
reaffirms its position on this question, for the Court has 
similarly held in State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 P.2d 
756 (1953), cert, denied, Neal v. Graham, 348 U.S. 982, 
99 L.Ed. 765, 75 S.Ct. 573; State v. Mares, 113 Utah 225, 
192 P.2d 861 (1948); and State v. Pollock, 102 Utah 587, 
129 P.2d 554 (1942). See also State v. Harries, 118 Utah 
-14-Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
260, 221 P. 2d 605 (1950), and State v. Kappas, iuO Mt.,th .:*/.*, 
114 P.2d 205 (1 9 45) . ' 
Additionally, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled on this question in Pappas v. United States, 216 F.2d 
515 (10th Cii 1954) : 
The general rule is that evidence 
of former offenses is not admissible to 
establish an offense charged in the 
indictment or information. But there are 
well recognized exceptions to the rule, 
one of which is that such evidence is 
competent to prove motive or intent." 
Id., 216 F.2d at 519, 
See also Robinson v. United States, 459 F.2d 8.; .' (;).i , C u . 
19 72); United States v. Freeman, 514 ',/<. * " : ..-
1975); and United States v. Stevens, 452 f.2d 63 3 (lCth 
Cir. 1972). . 
Appellant argued that the evidence that was admitted 
as to other crimes was for the purpose of disgracing him and 
making 1 : like a man of evil cl laracter. 3<nsporjer«t 
agrees that if that had been the purpose for admitting the 
evidence then it would properly have been excluded according 
to State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 45] P.2d 772 (1 969); but ' 
this was not the purpose for which the evidence was admitted, 
as the record clearly reveals (Tr.184-188; Arguments and court's 
ruling on first objection to the introduction of evidence of 
other crimes; Tr.259: 19-22; 264-313; 284-287). 
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It was not wise for appellant to rely on State 
v. Lopez, supra, because that case tends to support 
respondent's position. In Lopez, the Court was concerned 
with whether receiving testimony concerning stolen articles 
retrieved from the defendant's car related to another 
crime and whether this was a proper admission. The Utah 
Supreme Court held that it was admissible in that case 
because it was relevant to "explain the circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime." Ici. , 451 P.2d at 775. 
The remaining Ccises cited and relied upon by 
appellant do not address the question whether it is 
proper to admit evidence of other crimes for the purpose 
of showing motive. State v. Kazda, 14 Utah 2d 266, 382 P. 2d 
407 (1963)/ reversed the conviction of a man who had been 
convicted of assault with intent to commit murder and 
robbery where evidence had been admitted that the defendant 
had been arrested for criminal offenses in other states. 
There was no indication that the prosecution used this to 
show the defendant's motive or for any other purpose which 
would bring the case under an evidentiary exception. 
Correctly, therefore, the Court held that prejudicial error 
resulted because the evidence had "no other effect than to 
-16-
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degrade the defendant and give to the jury the impression 
he had a propensity for crime." Ld., 382 P.2d at 409. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court in State v> Dickson, 
12 Utah 2d 8f 361 P.2d 412 (1961), itself distinguished between 
a case where the evidence was properly admitted for the purpose 
of showing motive and where no such purpose was present: 
"A comment is in order in regard 
to State v. Neal, decided by this court, 
which is relied on by the State as 
justifying the questioning of the 
defendant as to being charged with another 
felony. While it is true that we there 
approved questioning the defendant con-
cerning his being charged with robberies 
for which he had not been convicted, that 
case stands for no such broad rule that it 
may be done generally; and it should not be 
extended beyond its true holding. The 
dangers of injustice in admitting evidence 
concerning other crimes must be recognized. 
The universally accepted general rule 
is that such evidence is not admissible if 
its effect is merely to disgrace the defendant 
or show his propensity to commit crime. How-
ever, where evidence has special relevancy 
to prove the crime of which the defendant 
stands charged, it may be allowed for that 
purpose; and the fact that it shows another 
crime will not render the evidence inadmissible. 
The justification given in the Neal case was 
that the evidence was deemed relevant to show 
Neal's motive for killing. The victim was a 
peace officer who was attempting to take him 
into custody. It was held proper to show that 
Neal was a fugitive from justice wanted on 
charges of robbery in California who would be 
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trying desperately to avoid capture by 
police and would therefore have a strong 
motive for killing the officer. No such 
special justifying circumstance existed 
here. 
Inasmuch as we cannot say with any 
degree of assurance that.there would not 
have been a different result in the absence 
of the error in cross examining the defendant 
about the incident in Texas, it must be 
regarded as prejudicial and the case remanded 
for a new trial. That being so, we deem it our 
duty to comment on additional matters raised 
on this appeal which may prove helpful in the 
further proceedings in this cause." Id., 
361 P.2d at 415. 
The other cases cited by appellant in Point II can be 
similarly refuted for appellant is arguing apples when the 
issue really is oranges. The record reveals the arguments 
for and against the admission of this evidence, and it clearly 
shows the basis for the court's decision. 
Appellant alternatively argues that the degree and 
extent of the evidence was so great as to unduly prejudice 
appellant. This argument is without merit. The trial court 
has discretion as to how much evidence is admissible. In 
Stratton v. United States, 387 F.2d 364 (10th Cir. 1968), the 
reviewing court held that the lower court did not abuse its 
discretion in admitting testimony of eighteen government 
witnesses as to transactions they had with the defendant 
which were similar to those for which the defendant was 
charged for the purpose of showing plan, motive, scheme or 
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design. In the instant case, according to the appellant's 
own statement of the facts, only five witnesses testified 
in regards to the alleged robbery. Clearly, if eighteen 
witnesses do not constitute prejudicial error, five 
witnesses do not even come close. Further, the testimony 
of those five witnesses comprises only sixty-five pages 
out of 883 for the entire trial transcript and not all of 
those sixty-five pages is devoted to evidence of other 
crimes. 
Respondent submits that the evidence relating to 
other crimes that was admitted clearly met the established 
standards governing such admissibility, and appellant has 
failed to show any abuse of discretion on the part of the 
trial court in allowing the introduction of it. This court 
should not disturb the decision of the trial court. 
POINT III 
THERE IS NO CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF ERRORS JUSTIFYING 
A REVERSAL IN THE INSTANT CASE. 
• The doctrine announced in State v. St. Clair, 
3 Utah 2d 230, 282 P.2d 323 (1955), that in some instances 
errors, which when standing alone would not justify reversal, 
may have such a cumulative effect so as to deprive the accused 
of a fair trial, is not disputed by respondent. However, 
respondent submits that the instant case does not meet the 
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degree of error and criteria set forth in State v. St. Clair,, 
supra. The duty of the appellant is set forth at 3 Utah 2d 
244: 
"On the basis of such appraisal, 
if the court can say with assurance that 
the evidence of the defendants1 guilt 
was so clear and convincing that no 
reasonable jury could be expected to 
return a different verdict, even in the 
absence of the irregularities, then the 
errors would be harmless and the verdict 
should be permitted to stand. On the 
other hand, if there is reasonable 
likelihood that in the absence of the 
errors a different verdict might have 
been rendered, a new trial should be 
granted." (Emphasis added.) 
In the instant case there is no cumulation of errors 
so as to jusify a conclusion that a different verdict would 
have been reached by the jury in the absence of such errors. 
In State v. St. Clair, supra, the cumulation of errors 
supported this court's finding that it was reasonably likely 
the verdict of the jury would have been different but for the 
errors. However, the alleged errors in the instant case do 
not justify such a conclusion. 
To conclude that a cumulation of errors has precluded 
appellant from having a fair trial first necessitates a con-
clusion that errors were committed. Respondent submits that 
this is not the case and that State v. St. Clair, supra, is 
clearly distinguishable. 
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Respondent submits that this court should follow 
State v. Sinclair, 15 Utah 2d 162, 389 P.2d 465 (1964), 
wherein it is stated at 15 Utah 2d 170: 
"Under our statute [Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-42-1 (1953)], which requires that 
errors which do not affect the essential 
rights of the parties be disregarded, we 
cannot properly interfere with the jury's 
verdict, unless upon a review of the whole 
case it should appear that there was error 
of sufficient gravity that the defendant's 
rights were prejudiced in some substantial 
way. We have found nothing of any such 
consequence here." (Emphasis added.) 
Respondent submits that a review of the whole record 
requires a conclusion that the appellant received a fair trial 
and that no error was committed that prejudiced appellant in 
a substantial way. 
CONCLUSION 
It is obvious that the jury was convinced from the 
evidence adduced at the trial of the appellant's guilt beyond 
a reasonable doubt. The record substantiates and necessitates 
a conclusion that no error was committed that resulted in a 
harmful prejudice to the appellant. Therefore, respondent 
submits that appellant's contentions are wholly without merit 
and that the conviction be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorn^v General 
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